· 6 min read
What caused the cost of living crisis in the UK?
The UK cost of living crisis had three overlapping causes: an energy price shock, post-pandemic supply chain disruption, and a wage-price dynamic that kept services inflation elevated long after goods prices stabilised. Here is how each contributed, and what the outlook is for costs coming down.
The UK cost of living crisis that began in 2021 and intensified through 2022 and 2023 had three overlapping causes. The first was a global energy price shock, triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The second was supply chain disruption and excess demand following the pandemic reopening. The third was a domestic wage-price dynamic that kept services inflation elevated long after the initial shocks had passed. Understanding how each contributed explains both why the crisis was so severe and why costs have been slow to come down.
The energy shock
Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 disrupted European gas supply at a point when global energy markets were already tight. The UK is more exposed to global gas prices than many European economies because of its dependence on gas for electricity generation and domestic heating. Wholesale gas prices rose by over 400 percent in the twelve months to August 2022. That increase passed through to domestic energy bills with a lag determined by the Ofgem price cap mechanism.
The Ofgem price cap, which limits the unit rate suppliers can charge rather than the total bill, rose from £1,277 per year for a typical household in October 2021 to £3,549 in October 2022. The government intervened with the Energy Price Guarantee and subsequent support schemes, limiting the effective cap for most households to £2,500 and then £2,000 through 2023. Even with that intervention, household energy costs roughly doubled from their pre-crisis level. For lower-income households, where energy represents a larger share of total spending, the impact was proportionally greater.
Energy prices have since fallen from their 2022 peak. The Ofgem price cap is now lower than its crisis high. But energy bills remain significantly above their pre-2021 baseline, and the gap between what households paid in 2020 and what they pay today has not closed. The crisis-period price increase is permanent in the sense that it has not reversed; it has merely stopped rising.
The supply chain and demand shock
The pandemic created two simultaneous disruptions that combined to push goods prices sharply higher. On the supply side, global production of manufactured goods, shipping capacity, and logistics networks were significantly disrupted from 2020 through 2022. Container shipping costs rose by a factor of ten at peak. Semiconductor shortages constrained production of vehicles, electronics, and appliances. Supply chains that had been optimised for just-in-time delivery proved fragile when demand patterns shifted abruptly.
On the demand side, pandemic-era savings and fiscal transfers gave households in developed economies unusually high spending power at the point when they were able to start consuming again. The combination of constrained supply and elevated demand pushed goods prices up sharply in 2021 and 2022. In the UK, this was compounded by additional friction from post-Brexit trade adjustments, which added cost and complexity to importing goods from the European Union.
The wage-price dynamic
Services inflation proved the most persistent component of the UK inflation surge. Whilst goods inflation peaked and began to fall in 2023 as supply chains normalised, services inflation remained elevated well into 2024 and 2025. The Bank of England's measure of services CPI did not fall back to levels consistent with the 2 percent inflation target until 2025.
The persistence was explained by a wage-price interaction. UK wages rose sharply from 2022 onwards as workers sought to recover real income lost to the energy and goods price shock. For context on how far that recovery has progressed, see our note on what the average UK wage actually buys in 2026. Labour shortages in hospitality, healthcare, logistics, and construction gave workers in those sectors unusual bargaining power. Nominal wage growth of 6 to 8 percent in 2023 fed through to the labour-intensive services sector, which passed higher costs on in the form of higher prices. Restaurants, professional services, repairs, and personal care all saw persistent price increases driven by higher wage bills.
This dynamic was not straightforwardly cost-push or demand-pull inflation; it was both simultaneously. Workers were right to seek higher wages given the purchasing power they had lost. Businesses were rational to raise prices given higher labour costs. The interaction between the two produced an inflationary dynamic that outlasted the initial energy shock by two to three years.
Will the cost of living ever go down in the UK?
The cost of living is unlikely to return to 2020 levels. That is not how inflation works: a sustained period of positive inflation raises the price level permanently, and the subsequent return to lower inflation rates means prices stabilise at their new higher level rather than reversing. A household that spent £150 per week on groceries in 2020 and now spends £185 to £190 is unlikely to see that bill fall back to £150 absent a significant and sustained deflationary shock, which the Bank of England is actively working to prevent.
What will improve is the relationship between wages and prices. Real wage growth has been positive since 2024, meaning incomes are now rising faster than prices. That process of gradual catch-up will continue if nominal wage growth stays above CPI inflation. But the pace is slow, and the cumulative gap that opened between 2021 and 2023 will take years rather than months to close at the projected rate of real wage improvement.
Specific cost categories that are likely to ease further: energy bills, as the Ofgem cap continues to reflect lower wholesale gas prices; mortgage costs, as interest rates continue to fall; and goods prices in categories where supply chain normalisation has already occurred but retail price adjustment has lagged. The stickiest components are services prices and housing costs, both of which are tied to domestic labour costs and domestic supply constraints rather than global commodity prices.
What has and has not improved
Goods price inflation has largely normalised. The supermarket price spikes of 2022 and 2023 have moderated, and whilst grocery bills remain elevated in absolute terms, the rate of increase has slowed significantly. Energy costs have fallen from their peak but not to pre-crisis levels. Services costs, covering everything from haircuts to restaurant meals to professional fees, remain sticky because the labour cost pressures that drove them up have not fully unwound.
Housing costs sit outside the standard CPI measure but represent one of the most significant real cost increases for households, particularly younger renters. Average UK private rents rose sharply from 2022 onwards as demand outpaced supply and buy-to-let landlords exited the market in response to regulatory and tax changes. Rental costs are not falling and are not expected to fall materially whilst housing supply remains constrained.
What this means for UK households now
The cost of living crisis has moved from an acute phase into a chronic one. Prices are no longer rising as fast as they were in 2022 and 2023, but they remain elevated, real wage recovery is gradual, and the households most affected, those with high housing costs, energy-intensive circumstances, or dependence on the stickiest price categories, continue to face significant financial pressure.
CPIx, Briefed's composite consumer pressure index, tracks the ongoing cost of living pressure across wages, energy, consumer credit, and retail demand in a single score, updated every 30 minutes. It is the fastest available read on whether conditions are genuinely improving or simply stabilising at a higher level. The Briefed daily briefing covers the CPI, PPI, and ONS cost releases that move it, every weekday at 6:45am. Free to read.